Designing and operating shared vehicle systems (bike-sharing/car-sharing/ride-sharing) is more challenging compared to other resource allocation settings due to complex network externalities: in such systems, altering prices in any location affects future supply throughout the system within very short timescales. Such externalities are well captured by steadystate Markov chain models, and hence these are widely used for shared vehicle systems in academic research and industry. However, using such models to design pricing policies is computationally difficult since the resulting optimization problem is high-dimensional and non-convex.
Introduction
the most relevant objective, since they are operated by private companies in close partnership with city governments. For instance, the Citi Bike system in New York City is run by Motivate, a private company, under service-level agreements with the NYC Department of Transportation. The complementary problem (maximizing welfare subject to revenue constraints) is of interest when such systems are managed by non-profit organizations (e.g., Pronto in Seattle); such multi-objective paradigms are also under consideration in other market-design settings such as the FCC spectrum auction [MS14] .
Our work leverages techniques from convex optimization and approximation algorithms to provide a unified framework for designing efficient algorithms for pricing (and other rebalancing controls) in closed queueing networks. We obtain performance guarantees for a large class of optimization problems (including multi-objective settings); significantly, our guarantees are near-optimal in the parameter regime of real systems. Moreover, given the widespread use of closed queueing models for a variety of other applications, 1 we anticipate that our framework can prove useful in these areas as well.
Outline of our Contributions
We model a shared vehicle system as a continuous-time Markov chain that tracks the number of vehicles (units) at each station (node), and use this framework to study a variety of pricing and control problems. We use pricing as a primary example to illustrate our methodology and present extensions to other controls in Section 5.
A brief description of our model is as follows (cf. Section 2 for details). Each station in the system observes a Poisson arrival of customers. Arriving customers draw a value and a destination from some known distribution. Upon arrival at a station, the customer is quoted a price and one of three scenarios occurs: i) the customer is not willing to pay the price, i.e. the price exceeds her value, and she leaves the system, ii) the customer is willing to pay the price but no unit is available at the node; therefore she again leaves the system, or iii) the customer is willing to pay the price, and a vehicle is available. A ride occurs only in the final case with the vehicle moving to the customer's destination. The state of the continuous-time Markov chain at the origin and the destination is then instantaneously updated. This describes the basic dynamics under which we aim to maximize the long-run average performance, measured by the throughput, the social welfare, or the revenue obtained in steady-state. Unfortunately, this problem is non-convex even in very basic settings (cf. Section 2.4), thereby posing technical hurdles for optimization.
In Section 3, we propose a simple pricing policy, based on optimizing over a novel convex relaxation, which we term elevated flow relaxation. Our relaxation separately tackles nonconvexities appearing in both the objective and the constraints. For the objective, we identify a concave pointwise upper bound which we call elevated objective. For the constraints, we derive a natural convex relaxation on the rates at which customers are served. As the elevated objective is bounded below by the original objective, optimal solutions in the elevated optimization problem are bounded below in value by optimal solutions in the original optimization problem.
In Section 4, we present our main result, namely that the above policy gives an approximation ratio of 1 + (n − 1)/m for the objectives we consider. Although, our policy is state independent, i.e. the prices do not differ based on the configuration of units across nodes, the guarantee holds with respect to the optimal state-dependent policy. The idea of the proof is based on the following three steps:
1. First, we notice that, for any state-dependent policy in the m-unit system (and therefore also for the optimal), there exists a feasible solution in our relaxation that upper bounds its value. Hence, the elevated value of our policy upper bounds the original objective of the optimal state-dependent policy in the m-unit system.
2. Next, we observe that the elevated objective of our policy is equal to the original objective in a hypothetical infinite-supply setting. For this part, we exploit a structural property of our solution, under which we prove that in the infinite-supply setting the elevated objective collapses to the original objective.
3. Last, we show that the performance of any policy in the m-unit setting approximates its performance in the infinite-supply setting within a factor of 1 + (n − 1)/m. The proof applies a combinatorial construction of a biregular graph that relates the state spaces of the m-and (m − 1)-unit systems.
In Section 5, we demonstrate the versatility of our results. In particular, we show that the above framework, comprising of a policy derived via an appropriate elevated flow relaxation, and the three-step process to prove its guarantees, can be extended and applied to other settings.
• In Section 5.1 we introduce two other rebalancing controls previously studied in the literature, and obtain 1+(n−1)/m approximation guarantees for the respective optimization problems.
In the first, units can move to a new location after ending a trip; in the second, customers can be matched to units at neighboring nodes. In both cases, we recover and strengthen the previous results.
• In Section 5.2 we use our techniques to optimize in multiobjective settings where the goal is to maximize one objective subject to a lower bound on another. Our techniques use a primal-dual method to obtain a (γ, γ) bicriteria approximation guarantee with γ = (1 + )(1 + n−1 m ) for any > 0. This is motivated by paradigms like Ramsey pricing as we discussed above.
• In Section 5.3 we show that similar approximation guarantees continue to hold when rides do not occur instantaneously but instead require some delay (travel time).
• In Section 5.4, we consider a special case of the basic pricing problem where the customers' value distributions depend only on their source node and the platform is limited to point prices, that are based only on the origin of a trip, but not on the destination. The latter assumption is motivated by contemporary schemes like surge pricing. We show that in this case the optimization problem then collapses to a one-dimensional concave maximization, allowing us to incorporate additional constraints.
Our results not only recover and unify all existing results in this area, but also provide rigorous approximation guarantees for a wide range of objective functions in all of the above settings. While our guarantees depend on the size of the system, they are close to 1 for realistic system parameters. For instance, for the parameters (m = 10000, n = 600) of New York City's Citi Bike system, we obtain an approximation ratio of 1.06.
Related work
There is a large literature on characterizing open and closed queueing-network models, building on seminal work of Jackson [Jac63] , Gordon and Newell [GN67] , and Baskett et al. [BCMP75] ; the books by Kelly [Kel11] and Serfozo [Ser99] provide an excellent summary. Optimal resource allocation in open queueing networks also has a long history, going back to the work of Whittle [Whi85] . However, there is much less work for closed networks, in part due to the presence of a normalization constant for which there is no closed-form (though it is computable in O(nm) time via iterative techniques [Buz73, RL80] ). Most existing work on optimizing closed queueing networks use heuristics, with limited or no guarantees. In contrast, our work focuses on obtaining algorithms with provable guarantees for a wide range of problems.
Three popular approaches for closed queueing-network optimization in the literature are: (i) using open queueing-network approximations, (ii) heuristically imposing a 'fairness' property, which we refer to as the demand circulation constraint (cf. Section 3.3), and (iii) characterizing the fluid limits of closed queueing networks, and obtaining solutions that are optimal in these scaling regimes. We now briefly describe each approach.
The first approach was formalized by Whitt [Whi84] , via the fixed-population-mean (FPM) method, where exogenous arrival rates are chosen to ensure the mean population is m. It has since been used in many applications; for example, Brooks et al. [BKM13] use it to derive policies for matching debris-removal vehicles to routes following natural disasters. Performance guarantees however are available only in restricted settings.
Another line of work is based on heuristics that enforce the demand circulation property (variously referred to as the demand rebalancing/fairness/bottleneck property). In transportation settings, George et al. used these to optimize weighted throughput [Geo12] , Zhang et al. to minimize rebalancing costs [ZP16] . Most works typically only provide asymptotic guarantees [GXS12] .
More recently, Ozkan and Ward [OW16] and Braverman et al. [BDLY16] characterized appropriate fluid (or large-market) limits for closed queueing networks, and used it to study the operations of ride-sharing systems. In contrast to our work, which focuses on optimizing a given finite-m system, these works consider a regime where m and the arrival rates of passengers together scale to ∞, and characterize the optimal policy in the limit. Within this limit, the former studied the assignment of customers to nearby drivers, whereas the latter considered directing drivers at the end of each trip to under-served locations. Our extensions to settings beyond pricing (cf. Section 5.1) are inspired by these works; in particular, we show that similar scaling results can be derived within our framework. Moreover, our work provides guarantees for the resulting policies in the finite case (i.e., before taking the limit), and also against a much more general class of state-dependent policies.
The closest work to ours is that of Waserhole and Jost [WJ14] , who provide a pricing policy for maximizing throughput in closed queueing networks, with the same approximation ratio we obtain. They do this via a different argument wherein they observe that, under the demand circulation property, the Markov chain is doubly stochastic, and hence has a uniform distribution (this was also noted earlier by Whitt [Whi84] ). A simple counting argument then implies that the probability of a station having a vehicle is m/(m + n − 1). Moreover, since the maximum throughput under any policy is bounded by the maximum demand circulation, the maximum throughput under demand circulation is within a m/(m + n − 1) factor of the optimum. This argument is finely tuned to this particular setting (maximizing throughput via pricing with no delays). In contrast, our approach can accommodate several objectives and rebalancing controls as well as delays.
Finally, we note that there is a parallel line of work which tackles settings with dynamic arrivals and pricing, using techniques from approximate dynamic programming [Ade07, LR10, HMW09] . These typically can deal only with small systems, as their dimensionality scales rapidly with the number of stations; moreover, many of the techniques have no provable guarantees.
Preliminaries
In this section, we first formally define our model of shared vehicle systems and formulate the optimal pricing problem. To capture the complex network externalities of the system, we define a probabilistic model of customer arrivals, which we analyze in steady state. Subsequently, we introduce known results from the queuing literature that provide the technical background upon which our analysis relies. Finally, we present an example that shows that even in the restricted sets of pricing policies, that are independent of the configuration of vehicles across the system, the optimization problems we consider are non-convex.
Basic setting
We consider a system with m units (corresponding to vehicles) and n nodes (corresponding to stations). Customers traveling between nodes i and j arrive at node i according to a Poisson process of rate φ ij . Each customer traveling from i to j has a value drawn independently from a distribution F ij (·). We assume that F ij has a density and that all values are positive with some probability, i.e. F ij (0) < 1. Upon arrival at i, a customer is quoted a price p ij , and engages a unit if her value exceeds this price, i.e. with probability 1 − F ij (p ij ), and at least one unit is available at node i; else she leaves the system.
As is common with pricing, the related optimization problems are often more easily framed in terms of the inverse demand (or quantile) function associated with the user as
For ease of presentation we assume that the density of F ij is positive everywhere in its domain, implying that there is a 1-1 mapping between prices and quantiles. As F ij is therefore invertible, we can write
. This allows us to abuse notation throughout the paper by using prices and quantiles interchangeably.
A continuous-time Markov chain tracks the number of units across nodes. At time t ≥ 0, the state of the Markov chain X(t) = (X 1 (t), . . . , X n (t)) contains the number of units X i (t) present at each node i. The state space of the system is denoted by S n,m = {(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) ∈ N n 0 | i x i = m}. 2 Note that the state-space is finite; moreover, |S n,m | = m+n−1 n−1
= Ω(m n ). Since our focus is on the long-run average performance, i.e. system performance under the steady state of the Markov chain, we henceforth suppress the dependence on t for ease of notation.
For ease of presentation, we assume that rides between nodes occur without delay. In the context of our model, this translates into an instantaneous state transition from X to X − e i + e j when a customer engages a unit to travel from i to j (where e i denotes the ith canonical unit vector). We relax this assumption in Section 5.3.
Pricing Policies and Objectives
We consider pricing policies that select point-to-point prices p ij as a function of the overall state X. Formally, given arrival rates and demand elasticities {φ ij , F ij (·)}, we want to design a pricing policy p(·) = {p ij (·)}, where each p ij : S n,m → R ∪ {±∞} maps the state to a price for a ride between i and j. Equivalently, we want to select quantiles q(·) = {q ij } where each q ij : S n,m → [0, 1]. For a fixed pricing policy p with corresponding quantiles q, the effective demand stream from i to j (i.e. customers traveling from node i to j with value exceeding p ij ) thus follows a state-dependent Poisson process with rate φ ij q ij (X). 3 State-dependent prices also allow us to capture unavailability by defining q ij (x) = 0 if x i = 0 (i.e. a customer with origin i is always turned away if there are no units at that station; recall we defined F ij (∞) = 1). Thus, a pricing policy p, along with arrival rates and demand elasticities {φ ij , F ij (·)}, determines the transitions of the Markov chain. Note that this is a finite-state Markov chain, and furthermore, is irreducible under weak assumptions on the prices and the demand (cf. Appendix A); hence, it has a unique steady-state distribution π(·) with π(x) ≥ 0 ∀ x ∈ S n,m and x∈Sn,m π(x) = 1.
Our goal is to design a pricing policy p to maximize the steady-state performance under various objectives. In particular, we consider objective functions that decompose into per-ride reward functions I ij : R → R, which correspond to the reward obtained from a customer engaging a ride between stations i and j at price p. The per-ride rewards corresponding to the three canonical objective functions are:
• Throughput: the total rate of rides in the system; for this, we set I T ij (p) = 1.
• Social welfare: the per-ride contribution to welfare is given by
• Revenue: to find the system's revenue rate, we can set I R ij (p) = p.
We abuse notation to define
) as a function of the quantile instead of the price. We also define the reward curves R ij (q) := q · I ij (q) (analogous to the notion of revenue curves; cf. [Har14] ). Our results require the technical condition that R ij (q) are concave in q, which implies that I ij (q) are non-increasing in q (equivalently I ij (p) are non-decreasing in p). We note that this assumption holds for throughput and welfare under all considered distributions, and revenue for regular distributions. For completeness, we prove these observations in Appendix B.
For a given objective, our aim is to select a pricing policy p, equivalently quantiles q, that maximizes the steady-state rate of reward accumulation, given by
Intuitively, Equation (1) captures that at any node i, customers destined for j arrive via a Poisson process with rate φ ij , and find the system in state x ∈ S n,m with probability π(x). They are then quoted a price p ij (x) (corresponding to quantile q ij (x)), and engage a ride with probability q ij (x). The resulting ride then contributes in expectation I ij (q ij (x)) to the objective function. Recall that unavailability of units is captured by our assumption that q ij (x) = 0 whenever x i = 0.
State-Independent Pricing and Closed Queueing Models
The Markov chain described in Section 2.1 has the structure of a closed queueing network 4 (cf. [Ser99, Kel11] ), a well-studied class of models in applied probability. Our analysis crucially relies on some classical results from the queuing theory literature, which we review in this section. Our presentation here closely resembles that of Serfozo [Ser99] . One particular class of pricing policies is that of state-independent policies, wherein we set point-to-point prices {p ij } which do not react to the state of the system. As a consequence, the rate of units departing from any node i at any time t when X i (t) > 0 is a constant, independent of the state of the network. The resulting model is a special case of a closed queueing model proposed by Gordon and Newell [GN67] . Definition 1. A Gordon-Newell network is a continuous-time Markov chain on states x ∈ S n,m , in which for any state x and any i, j ∈ [n], the chain transitions from x to x − e i + e j at a rate λ ij µ i 1 {x i (t)>0} , where µ i > 0 is referred to as the service rate at node i, and λ ij ≥ 0 as the routing probabilities satisfying j λ ij = 1.
In other words, if units are present at a node i in state x, then departures from that node occur according to a Poisson distribution with rate µ i > 0; conditioning on a departure, the destination j is chosen according to state-independent routing probabilities λ ij .
The Markovian dynamics resulting from state-independent pricing policies fulfill the conditions of Gordon-Newell networks: fixing a price p ij (with corresponding q ij ) results in a Poisson process with rate φ ij q ij of arriving customers willing to pay price p ij . These customers engage a unit only if one is available, else leave the system. Thus, given quantiles q, the time to a departure from node i is distributed exponentially with rate µ i = j φ ij q ij when X i > 0 and with rate 0 otherwise. Further, conditioned on an arriving customer having value at least equal to the quoted price, the probability that the customer's destination is j, is λ ij = φ ij q ij / k φ ik q ik , independent of system state.
One advantage of considering state-independent policies (and drawing connections with GordonNewell networks) is that the resulting steady-state distribution {π p,m (x)} x∈Sn,m can be expressed in product form, as established by the Gordon-Newell theorem. Theorem (Gordon-Newell Theorem [GN67] ). Consider an m-unit n-node Gordon-Newell network with transition rates µ i and routing probabilities λ ij . Let {w i } i∈[n] denote the invariant distribution associated with the routing probability matrix {λ ij } i,j∈ [n] , and define the traffic intensity at node i as r i = w i / j φ ij . Then the stationary distribution is given by:
where the Gordon-Newell normalization constant is given by
We now show how the Gordon-Newell theorem can be used to simplify the objective function in Equation (1). Recall that for an m-unit system with state-independent policy p (with corresponding quantiles q), we obtain a Gordon-Newell network with service rate j φ ij q ij and routing probabilities φ ij q ij / k φ ik q ik at node i. Let {π(x)} x∈Sn,m be the corresponding steady-state distribution. Since q is no longer a function of the system state, we can no longer set q i = 0 when X i = 0. Instead, we define A i,m (q) = x∈Sn,m π(x)1 {x i >0} as the steady-state availability of units at node i (i.e. the probability in steady-state that at least one unit is present at node i), and f ij,m (q) = A i,m (q) · φ ij q ij to be the steady-state rate of units moving from node i to j. Then, from Equation (2), one can derive (see e.g. Proposition 1.33 and Equation 1.31 in
Notice that r i (q) denotes the traffic intensity as defined above. Now, the objective in Equation (1) can be written as
For ease of notation, we omit the explicit dependence on m when clear from context.
The infinite-unit limit: The stationary distribution described above (for state-independent pricing policies) holds for any finite m; moreover, it can also be used to obtain the limiting distribution when the number of units tends to infinity. This infinite-unit limit is described in detail in Section 3.7 in [Ser99] (and we provide more details in Appendix C). For the purposes of our results, we rely on one particular fact, which we state in the proposition below. Recall first that given p = {p ij }, the quantities w i (p) and r i (p) are independent of m. Proposition 2. Given a policy with quantiles q, in the infinite-unit limit, the steady-state availability of each node i is given by r i (q)/ max j r j (q); in particular, there exists at least one node i with A i (q) = 1.
The existence of a node with availability 1 essentially captures the fact that in an infinite-unit system, at least one node must have an infinite number of units. For a formal proof of this result, cf. Section 3.7 in [Ser99] .
Non-concavity of objective under state-independent pricing
Directly optimizing the finite-unit system is non-trivial as the objective function is not concave in prices (or quantiles); we now demonstrate this in a simple network (m = 1 and n = 3), using throughput as the objective. Our example is presented in Figure 1 . The network comprises of three nodes (A, B, C); the labels on the edges show the effective demand rate φ ij (q) with which people wanting to move from node i to node j arrive for the corresponding pricing policies p (and corresponding quantiles q). In particular, the first figure corresponds to setting all prices to 0 (quantiles to 1), while in the second and third figures, we increase the price between B and C to set quantile q BC = (1 + )/2 in figure II, and q BC = in figure III. Note that the demand in network II is the average of the demands in networks I and III. To prove that this is non-concave with respect to the demand rates we now demonstrate that the throughput in network II is less than half of the sum of its value in networks I and III. To compute the throughput in each network, note that the expected waiting time at a node is inversely proportional to the total effective demand at each node. Furthermore, the unit makes exactly two rides between consecutive visits to node B. Thus, the expected throughput is twice the expected rate of return to node B. 5 The expected return-time to B in the three networks can be computed as 6
Thus, the throughput in I and II is O( ), whereas it is constant in III, so the throughput is non-concave in the demand-rates (quantiles).
Pricing via the Elevated Flow Relaxation
In this section, we present our algorithm for the pricing problem. Section 2.4 demonstrates that the state-independent pricing problem is non-convex; moreover, this non-convexity appears in both the objective and the constraints. We circumvent this via a novel convex relaxation, based on two separate interventions, that alleviates the technical hurdles. Surprisingly, the resulting pricing policy has strong performance guarantees even with respect to state-dependent policies, as we prove in Section 4.
Elevated Objective Function
Recall from Equation (4) that our objective can be written as
note that q ij ≤ q ij , and moreover, unlike the quantiles q ij which are in one-to-one correspondence to prices, there is no straightforward way to derive q ij from prices. Since we assume that the per-ride rewards I ij (·) are non-increasing on the quantile space, we have I ij (q ij ) ≤ I ij ( q ij ). We now define the elevated objective function as
The elevated objective has two useful properties: i) for all m and q, the elevated objective upper bounds the true objective function, i.e. Obj(q) ≥ Obj m (q), and ii) it is a concave function of q (since we focus on objectives corresponding to concave reward curves R ij (·)).
The Flow Polytope
We now turn our attention to the constraints of our pricing problem. As we discussed above, each pricing policy (with corresponding quantiles q) realizes steady-state flows (steady-state rates of units) f ij,m (q) = A i,m (q)φ ij q ij . As before, we define the change of variables
Note that while it is not the case that all flows obeying natural flow constraints can be realized as steady-state flows {f ij,m (q)} under some policy q, all realized flows do have to obey flow conservation and capacity constraints. This motivates the following relaxation { q ij } of the set of possible steady-state flows under any policy q and for any number of units m.
A natural capacity constraint arises since prices only decrease demand; the steady-state flow of units between a pair of nodes is thus bounded above by the rate of customers wanting to travel between the nodes. We refer to this constraint as demand bounding. Formally, for every pair (i, j), we have f ij,m (q) ≤ φ ij and hence
Next, any steady-state flow must obey a natural flow conservation constraint, wherein the rate of incoming units at each node must equal the rate of outgoing units. We refer to this constraint as supply circulation. Formally, at any node i, we have k f ki,m (q) = j f ij,m (q), and hence
Note that the above two constraints hold for every finite m and every q; 7 moreover, it is also true for the infinite-unit limit (cf. Appendix C). We refer to the set of flows defined by the above (linear) constraints as the flow polytope.
Pricing via the Elevated Flow Relaxation
Combining the elevated objective and the flow polytope, we obtain the elevated flow relaxation program (cf. Algorithm 1). Note that this is a convex optimization problem since the objective function is concave while the polytope is linear; hence it can be efficiently maximized.
Algorithm 1 The Elevated Flow Relaxation Program
Require: arrival rates {φ ij }, value distributions F ij (·), reward curves R ij (·).
1: Find q ij that solves the following relaxation:
Note that the prices (quantiles) returned by Algorithm 1 impose the flow conservation not only on the units (supply) but also on the customers (demand); we henceforth refer to this property as demand circulation.
Main approximation guarantee
In this section, we prove the main approximation guarantee of the paper, which bounds the performance of Algorithm 1 with respect to the optimal state-dependent pricing policy. This is formalized in the following theorem Theorem 3. Consider any objective function Obj m for the m-unit system with concave reward curves R ij (·). Let p be the pricing policy returned by Algorithm 1 and Opt m be the value of the objective function for the optimal state-dependent pricing policy in the m-unit system. Then
Proof. The proof is based on the following three lemmas. First (Lemma 4), we show that the objective of the optimal state-independent policy is upper bounded by the elevated objective of the policy p returned by the Elevated Flow relaxation (Algorithm 1). Next (Lemma 5), we show that the elevated objective of p is equal to its objective in the infinite-unit system. Finally (Lemma 6), we show that for any pricing policy (and so in particular for p), the objective in the m-unit system is within a factor of m m+n−1 of the objective in the infinite-unit system. Lemma 4. For objectives with concave reward curves R ij (·), the value of the objective function of the optimal state-dependent policy is upper bounded by the value of the elevated objective function of the pricing policy p returned by Algorithm 1
Lemma 5. The value of the elevated objective function of the pricing policy p returned by Algorithm 1 is equal to the value of its objective function in the infinite-unit system
Lemma 6. For any state-independent pricing policy p, the value of the objective of the policy p in the m-unit system is at least m/(m + n − 1) times the value of the objective of the same policy in the infinite-unit system.
In the remainder of this section, we prove these three lemmas.
From finite-unit state-dependent to the elevated flow relaxation
Lemma 7 (Lemma 4 restated). For objectives with concave reward curves R ij (·), the value of the objective function of the optimal state-dependent policy is upper bounded by the value of the elevated objective function of the pricing policy p returned by Algorithm 1
Proof. Our proof applies Jensen's inequality to show that Opt m is bounded above by the elevated objective value of some quantiles q that form a feasible solution of the elevated flow relaxation program. Since the pricing policy p maximizes this mathematical program, the lemma follows.
Let q (X) denote the quantiles of the optimal state dependent policy and π (X) denote the steady-state distribution it induces. Then Opt m can be written as
We define q via
Since the price-setting reward curve is concave, Jensen's inequality implies that
Also, note that, by definition q ij (X) = 0 when X i = 0. Therefore demand circulation and demand bounding constraints of the elevated flow relaxation program are satisfied as convex combinations of the state-dependent supply circulation and demand bounding properties.
Hence q is a feasible solution to the elevated flow relaxation program and the result follows.
From the elevated flow relaxation to infinite-unit state-independent
Lemma 8 (Lemma 5 restated). The value of the elevated objective function of the pricing policy p returned by Algorithm 1 is equal to the value of its objective function in the infinite-unit system
Proof. The pricing policy p satisfies the demand circulation property since it is a feasible solution to the elevated flow relaxation program. By Lemmas 9 and Proposition 2, the availabilities at all nodes is equal to 1. This means that (i) the value of the objective function in the infinite-unit limit for pricing policy p is equal to its elevated value (since no term was increased), and (ii) the flow of customers on each edge is equal to φ ij q ij .
Lemma 9. For any m (including ∞) if state-independent quantiles q satisfies the demand circulation property then, at all nodes i, the availabilities A i,m (q) are equal.
Proof. Consider i * ∈ arg max A i,m (q). Then the demand circulation and supply circulation properties imply
By choice of i * , each summand is nonnegative, so for each j such that φ ji * > 0 we obtain A j,m (q) = A i * ,m (q). All availabilities being equal then follows inductively using connectivity of the underlying graph.
From finite-unit to infinite-unit state-independent
Lemma 10 (Lemma 6 restated). For any state-independent pricing policy p, the value of the objective of the policy p in the m-unit system is at least m/(m + n − 1) times the value of the objective of the same policy in the infinite-unit system.
Proof. By Lemma 11, we have:
In order to uniformly bound the above expression, the essential ingredient is the construction of a particular weighted biregular graph between the states in S n,m−1 and the states in S n,m . In this graph, non-zero edges only exist between neighboring states, i.e. between states y ∈ S n,m−1 and y + e i ∈ S n,m ; further, the total weight of edges incident to any state in S n,m is equal to 1, and the total weight of edges incident to any state in S n,m−1 is equal to m+n−1 m
. We construct such a graph in Lemma 12.
Throughout this proof, we use s for a state in S n,m−1 and t for one in S n,m . The weight of the edge (s, t) in the bipartite graph constructed in Lemma 12 is denoted by ω st .
The third equality holds as s ω st = 1, while the second-to-last follows from t ω st = m+n−1 m . Crucially, ω st > 0 only holds for neighboring states s and t, which implies the inequality.
Lemma 11. For any state-independent pricing policy p, let A m (p) = max i (A i,m (p)) denote the maximum steady-state availability across all nodes. Then the objective function of p in the m-unit system is related to the infinite-limit objective as
Proof. Let B i (p) = j φ ij q ij · I ij (q ij ) denote the contribution of node i to the objective per unit of time in which station i is available. By substituting 
where the last equality follows from the characterization of the availabilities in Equation (3).
Lemma 12. We call y ∈ S n,m−1 a neighbor of y + e i ∈ S n,m ∀i. There exists a weighted biregular graph on S n,m−1 ∪S n,m such that i) an edge has non-zero weight only if it is connecting neighboring states, ii) for any vertex corresponding to a state in S n,m−1 the total weight of incident edges is equal to m+n−1 m , and iii) for any vertex corresponding to a state in S n,m the total weight of incident edges is equal to 1.
Proof. Our construction is shown in figure 2. Each state x ∈ S n,m is adjacent to x − e i ∈ S n,m−1 for all i with x i > 0. On these edges, the weight is . Finally, there is only weight on edges between neighboring states. This concludes the proof of the lemma.
To prove Theorem 3 it suffices to show that Lemma 6 holds when p is a demand circulation. This has been known since the 1980s [Whi84] and has been used in similar settings [WJ14] . However, in the next section (cf. Sections 5.1, 5.4) we consider scenarios under which no demand circulation is optimal/feasible. For these, the stronger statement of Lemma 6 is required. Figure 2: Construction of biregular graph between states in S n,m and S n,m−1 , as described in Lemma 12. Fig. 2(a) shows the construction for (S 2,3 ,S 2,2 ) and (S 2,2 , S 2,1 ). Fig. 2(b) shows the general construction. Note that the sum of weights of incident edges for any node on the left (i.e. any state in S n,m ) is 1, while it is (m + n − 1)/m for nodes on the right (i.e. states in S n,m−1 ).
Extensions
In this section, we relax some restrictions we previously imposed. All of the algorithms and proofs for these extensions make use of our elevated flow relaxation framework of Section 3, demonstrating its generality. First, in Section 5.1, we allow the designer to have additional rebalancing controls beyond pricing by redirecting supply and demand. Second, in Section 5.2, we consider multi-objective settings where the goal is to maximize some objective subject to a constraint on another. Next, in Section 5.3, we relax our assumption that changes in the state should be instantaneous by allowing travel-times for the trips. For each of these results, the proof follows from the three steps of Section 4; coincidentally, in each case, two steps are easily extended whereas one is more evolved. Further, the more evolved lemma is different for the three settings, hinting that each of the lemmas captures some inherent structure of the problem. Last, in Section 5.4, we consider constrained settings where prices can only depend on the source and where the prices should come from a discrete set.
Beyond pricing
Pricing is just one of several control levers in shared vehicle systems for balancing supply and demand; we now investigate two other levers, which we refer to as supply redirection and demand redirection, and show how they fit into our approximation framework. In the former we make a decision at the end of every trip on whether the unit remains at the destination of the trip or moves elsewhere whilst incurring a cost. In the latter, we redirect passengers arriving at a node to take units from nearby nodes. 9
Supply Redirection
We consider a state-dependent policy r(X) which, for each trip ending at a node i, chooses to redirect the unit to some other node j (leading to state X − e i + e j ), else allows the unit to stay at i. For a state-independent policy, let r ij ∈ [0, 1] be the probability that an arriving unit at i is redirected to j. We assume that each redirection from i to j has associated cost c ij , and that units arriving empty (redirected) are not redirected again.
With m units, a fixed pricing policy p (with corresponding quantiles q), and a fixed redirection policy r, we observe a rate f ij,m (q, r) of customers traveling from i to j, and a rate of redirected vehicles z ij,m (q, r) from i to j, i.e. trips with destination i which are redirected to j. For a state-independent policy, since each unit arriving at i is redirected to j with probability r ij , it holds that z ij,m (q, r) = r ij k f ki,m (q, r).
Similarly to the correspondence between q ij and f ij,m , we observe a correspondence between r ij and z ij,m , wherein the former are the controls and induce the latter in the objective via the steady-state dynamics. As a result, the objective can be written as
In order to define the constraints of the elevated flow relaxation, we write (as in Section 3) q ij = f ij,m (q, r)/φ ij and z ij = z ij,m (q, r). We can now write the following relaxed flow polytope:
The first constraint is demand bounding, exactly as explained in Section 3. The second is a variant of the supply circulation in Section 3 to incorporate redirected vehicles. Finally, the third reflects that only units that are dropping off customers at a node, but not empty ones, can be redirected. Note that these constraints hold for any state-dependent policy as any policy induces such rates f ij,m and z ij,m .
Using the reward curves R ij (·) defined in Section 3, we obtain an upper bound Obj(q, r) on our desired objective via the Elevated Flow Relaxation with the above constraints; through this, we obtain prices and redirection probabilities in Algorithm 2. Note that the redirection probabilities r ij returned by the algorithm correspond to the rate of redirected units z ij returned by the relaxation over the total incoming rate of (non-empty) units at node i, i.e. k φ kj q kj . We now derive the equivalent of Theorem 3 to bound the performance of this algorithm. Theorem 13. Consider any objective function Obj m for the m-unit system with concave reward curves R ij (·). Let p and r be the pricing and redirection policies returned by Algorithm 2, and Opt m be the objective of the optimal state-dependent policies in the m-unit system. Then
Opt m .
Algorithm 2 The Elevated Flow Relaxation Program with Supply Redirection
Require: arrival rates {φ ij }, value distributions F ij (·), reward curves R ij (·), rerouting costs c ij . 1: Find {q ij , z ij } that solves the the following relaxation:
Output state-independent prices p ij = F −1 ij (1 − q ij ) and redirection probabilities r ij = z ij / k φ ki q ki Proof. The proof closely resembles that of Theorem 3. As before, we show the inequality through three intermediate steps: Obj ∞ ( p, r) . The proof of the first inequality is the same as in Lemma 4, with the relaxation defined in Algorithm 1 replaced by the relaxation defined in Algorithm 2. The second step relies on Lemma 14, which uses Lemma 9 to prove that in the infinite-unit system all availabilities are 1. Based on this claim, similarly to the proof of Lemma 5, we observe that the flow of customers on each edge is φ ij q ij . The definition of the redirection probabilities in Algorithm 2 then immediately implies that z ij,∞ ( p, r) = z ij , i.e. the flow of redirected units from i to j is also equal to the value of z ij in the solution of the relaxation. Finally, for the third step, we apply the same proof as in Lemma 6 with just one small modification. In Lemma 6, B
Proof. Denote by q the quantiles corresponding to p. We consider a closed queueing network with the same transition probabilities between states as the one resulting from q and r. In our hypothetical network, quantiles are all one, there is no redirection, and the demand circulation property holds. Since the hypothetical network does not have redirection and satisfies the demand circulation property, Lemma 9 implies that there the availabilities at all nodes are equal. However, the two networks have the same transition probabilities so they also have the same steady-state distribution. As a result, in the original network all availabilities are also equal and thus, equal to 1 in the infinite-unit limit. We define the demand in the hypothetical network as
Observe that transitions occur at the same rate in this network as in the one with q and r. Since quantiles are equal to 1, the demand circulation property says that jφ ij = kφ ki . To show this property, notice first that the demand at node i is
On the other hand, due to the definition ofφ ij (first equality), the definition of r ij in Algorithm 2 (third equality), and the supply circulation constraint in Algorithm 2 (last equality), the demand of customers traveling to i is
Demand Redirection
For the control defined in this section, we assume that there exists a graph G = (V, E) on the set of nodes with edges between nodes that are so close that a customer arriving at one node can be served through a vehicle at an adjacent node. We consider a state-dependent policy µ(X) which, for each customer arriving at node i willing to pay the price quoted, decides from which node in {i} ∪ {j : (i, j) ∈ E}, the customer is served. With m units, fixed quantiles q(X), and a fixed matching policy µ(X), we observe a rate f ij,m (q, µ) of customers arriving at i that travel to j, potentially after being matched to a unit at k, and a rate z ik,m (q, µ) of customers that arrived to travel from i but have been matched to a unit at k. We can write the objective in this setting as Obj m (q, µ) = i,j f ij,m (q, µ)I ij (q). We again write q ij = f ij,m (q, r)/φ ij and z ij = z ij,m (q, r) to define the following relaxed flow polytope:
The first constraint is again demand bounding. The second is a variant of the supply circulation to incorporate matchings to nearby nodes. In particular, the left hand side accounts for the total number of units arriving at node i, which equals all users arriving at i together with all units arriving due to matching from nearby nodes k. Similarly, the right hand side accounts for the total number of units leaving i, which are the users leaving from i together with users from other nodes j that use supply at i. Finally, the third ensures that customers are matched only to units arriving at nearby nodes. Maximizing the elevated objectives over these constraints again yields a m/(m + n − 1) approximation algorithm. We omit the proof, because of its similarity to the one of Theorem 13.
Algorithm 3 The Elevated Flow Relaxation Program With Matching
Require: arrival rates {φ ij }, value distributions F ij (·), reward-curves R ij (·), edges E. 1: Find {q * ij , z * ij } that solves the the following relaxation:
Output state-independent prices p ij = F −1 ij (1 − q ij ) and matching probabilities µ ij = z ij / k φ ik q ik Theorem 15. Solving for the elevated objective under the constraints defined above yields a m/(m + n − 1) approximation algorithm for pricing and matching.
In Appendix D we show that the results obtained in this section continue to hold in settings, in which matching and/or redirecting is allowed, but pricing is not. In such scenarios, the optimal solution may not have the demand circulation property. Nevertheless, the same techniques yield m/(m + n − 1) approximation algorithms.
Multi-objective optimization
We now discuss how to derive bicriterion approximations in multi-objective optimization settings, in which one objective is maximized subject to a lower bound on another. Similarly to Section 3, we construct an elevated flow relaxation for this problem. To circumvent the additional nonconvex constraint stemming from the second objective, we apply a primal-dual approach via a Lagrangian relaxation of the problem. Binary search on the Lagrange multipliers lets us interpolate between a solution that is feasible but possibly far from optimal and one that is infeasible. Interestingly, a convex combination (in the quantile space) of the two solutions yields, via two applications of Jensen's inequality, a solution that is both near-optimal and feasible.
We first describe the elevated flow relaxation. For ease of presentation, we restrict ourselves to pricing. Formally, the problem is as follows: given a requirement c > 0 and objectives Φ(·) and Ψ(·), we wish to maximize Φ(q) subject to Ψ(q) ≥ c. Both Φ(·) and Ψ(·) can be decomposed into per-ride rewards with associated reward curves R Ψ ij and R Φ ij . Similarly to Section 3, we first elevate both objectives to obtain Φ and Ψ, using the fact that the per-ride rewards are non-increasing on the quantiles. For the former, this gives an upper bound on the original value of Φ; for the latter it loosens the constraint (so all solutions that were feasible before are still feasible). We then impose the supply circulation and demand bounding constraints to create the flow polytope constraints. This mathematical program is the elevated flow relaxation program for our multi-objective setting.
We apply a primal-dual analysis using a Lagrangian relaxation. Consider the Lagrangian objective function:
where Λ ≥ 0 denotes the Lagrange multiplier, which essentially captures the tradeoff between the two objectives. Note that the non-convex constraint is removed and, instead, a concave function is added to the objective. The resulting reward curve of the Lagrangian objective is still concave and can be optimized via a program similar to the one of Algorithm 1 with elevated objective L(Λ, q) and the same flow polytope constraints. We use this program as a black-box and refer to it as the Lagrangified Program. Defining q(Λ) ∈ arg max q L(Λ, q) notice that Φ( q(Λ)) is a non-increasing function of Λ, whereas Ψ( q(Λ)) is non-decreasing. Hence, the maximum value of Ψ that is feasible in the elevated flow relaxation program occurs at the minimum Λ such that Ψ( q(Λ)) ≥ c. Our algorithm (Algorithm 4) proceeds by applying binary search on possible values of Λ; once the lower (infeasible) and the upper (feasible) bound on Λ are sufficiently close, we compute an appropriate convex combination. We proceed with the following theorem. In this part, we assume that the per-ride rewards are also positive. Proof. Notice first that q is the convex combination of two solutions that both fulfill the constraints of the Langragified program, enforcing demand bounding and the demand circulation property. Thus, q does as well, and Lemma 5 and 6 apply for both Ψ(·) and Φ(·), i.e.
Further, by Lemma 17, Ψ(q ) ≥ c and Φ(q ) ≥ (1 − )Opt m , implying the result.
Lemma 17. The policy q has Ψ(q ) ≥ c and has Φ(q ) ≥ (1 − )Opt m where Opt m is the value of the optimal state-dependent policy in the m-unit system.
Proof. We first consider the corner case that the algorithm terminates at step 2. Then, the condition of step 2 implies that Ψ(q ) ≥ c; hence, Φ(q ) ≥ Opt m holds by Lemma 4.
Otherwise, note that, by our choice of Λ max , q(Λ max ) is guaranteed to be a feasible solution for the elevated flow relaxation program (c.f. Lemma 18). Thus, we may do binary search on the Lagrange multipliers (cf. steps 3-6) to find Λ , Λ u such that Ψ( q(Λ u )) ≥ c, Ψ( q(Λ u )) < c and Λ u − Λ ≤ .
Next, we bound the performance of the optimal state-dependent policy q in the m-unit system by the Lagrangian. Similary to Lemma 4, there exists a quantile q that satisfies the supply circulation and demand bounding constraints and has Φ(q ) ≥ Φ(q) and Ψ(q ) ≥ Ψ(q). The latter, combined with Ψ(q) ≥ c, implies that q is a feasible solution for the elevated flow relaxation program. As a result, by weak duality, for all Λ ≥ 0, we obtain
Let q = q(Λ ) and q u = q(Λ u ). Since the reward curves are concave, applying Jensen's inequality and using the definition of θ in step 7 of the algorithm, we obtain:
Regarding the objective, since L(Λ, q(Λ)) ≥ Opt m for all Λ ≥ 0, we obtain:
Inequality (7) holds due to Λ u ≤ Λ + (cf.
Step 6) and Ψ( q ) ≥ c; inequality (8) only drops θ( Ψ( q l ) − c) ≥ 0; finally, the equality in (9) is by our choice of θ and the inequality follows from applying Jensen's inequality two times, once for each objective. The relations in (10) follow by first substituing = Φ /Ψ , then bounding Ψ( q ) − c ≤ Ψ( q(∞)) = Ψ and Φ = Φ( q(∞)) ≤ Φ(q ). The fact 1 − < 1/(1 + ) concludes the proof.
The algorithm makes log(Λ max / ) calls to the Lagrangian program. The following is proven in Appendix F. Lemma 18. For Λ max = 2Φ /(Ψ − c), q(Λ max ) is a feasible solution of the elevated flow relaxation.
Incorporating travel-times between nodes
We now discuss how we can remove the assumption that units move instantaneously between nodes, by adding travel-times between nodes. We state our result for pricing (with quantiles q); however, our arguments below only depend on the properties of the Markov chain, and hence can be extended for the other controls we consider.
A standard way to model travel-times is to assume that each unit takes an i.i.d. random time to travel from node i to j. Formally, we expand the network state to X = {X i (t), X ij (t)}, where node queues X i (t) track the number of available units at node i, and link queues X ij (t) track the number of units in transition between nodes i and j. When a customer engages a unit to travel from i to j, the state changes to X − e i + e ij (i.e., X i → X i − 1 and X ij → X ij + 1). The unit remains in transit for an i.i.d. random time, distributed exponentially 11 with mean τ ij . When the unit reaches its destination, the state changes to X − e ij + e j . Finally, we assume that pricing policies and passenger-side dynamics remain the same as before; in particular, we assume that the demand characteristics {φ ij , F ij } and reward-functions {I ij } are independent of the actual transit times (dependence on average transit times τ ij can be embedded in the functions).
The system described above is a generalization of the Gordon-Newell network (Definition 1) referred to as a BCMP network (introduced by [BCMP75] ; cf. [Ser99] , Section 3.3; also see [ZP16] for the use of such a model for vehicle sharing). It is also a special case of a closed migration process; our presentation here follows Kelly and Yudovina [KY14] (Chapter 2). Definition 19. A closed migration process on states S n 2 ,m is a continuous-time Markov chain in which transitions from state X to state X − e i + e j occur at rate λ ij µ i (X i ) when X i > 0 and at rate 0 otherwise. The λ ij again form routing probabilities with k λ ik = 1, λ ij ≥ 0 ∀i, j. Notice that µ i (X i ) is a function of X i only, whereas λ ij are independent of the state alltogether.
Given quantiles q, the above-described process is a closed migration process with λ i,ij = φ ij q ij / k φ ik q ik and λ ij,j = 1 for every i and j. Further, the service rate µ i (X i ) = k φ ik q ik when X i > 0 for node queues and µ ij (X ij ) = X ij /τ ij for link queues. Intuitively, the latter captures the idea that each of the X ij units has an exponential rate of 1/τ ij and therefore the rate until the first is removed from the link queue is X ij /τ ij . The stationary distribution can then be obtained as follows. Theorem 20 (Theorem 2.4 in [KY14] ). For a closed migration process as described in Definition 19, let {w i } i∈[n 2 ] denote the invariant distribution associated with the routing probability matrix {λ ij } i,j∈ [n] . Then the equilibrium distribution for a closed migration process is
is a normalizing constant.
This implies for our setting, with w denoting again the invariant distribution of the routing matrix 12
11 This is primarily for ease of notation; our results extend if the travel time is distributed according to some general Gij(·).
12 In comparison to the invariant distribution w I when rides occur instantaneously, w D with delays would be One consequence of the above characterization is that the resulting flows f ij,m (q) continue to satisfy demand bounding and supply circulation -consequently, the Elevated Flow Relaxation (cf. Algorithm 1) continues to provide an upper bound. Moreover, adding link queues does not affect the optimization problems we consider in the infinite-unit system; in particular, Lemma 5 also continues to hold in this setting. Finally, from Lemma 11, we know that the ratio of objectives between the infinite-unit system and the finite-unit system equals the maximum availability, among all nodes, in the finite-unit system, i.e.
Objm(q)
Obj∞(q) = max i A i,m (q). In order to obtain an approximation ratio, we now need to understand how max i A i,m (q) changes when link queues are added.
Let M denote the random variable corresponding to the steady-state number of available (i.e. not in transit) units across all nodes, and define
. Now we have the following Lemma 21. Conditioned on M , the distribution of {X i } i∈ [n] in the network with travel-times is identical to an n-node M -unit Gordon-Newell network with the same quantiles and arrival rates.
This follows directly from the product-form nature of the steady-state distribution in Equation (11). Using this, we now obtain the following bound for the m-unit system availability. Lemma 22. For any network with parameters {φ ij , F ij (·), τ ij } if m ≥ 100 and quantiles q satisfy
Note that the above converges to 1 as m → ∞.
Proof. First, for any given policy q, as before we have the realized flows f ij,m (q) = q ij φ ij A i,m (q); moreover, this is the expected rate of units entering link queue X ij . Let D = m − M be the number of units which are in transit. Now, by Little's law (cf. [Kel11] or [Ser99] ), we have that the expected number of units in link queues is given by i,j A i,m (q)φ ij q ij τ ij .
Note that the link queues {X ij } are stochastically dominated by independent M/M/∞ queues with input rate φ ij q ij and average transition time τ ij . This follows from a simple coupling argument, where incoming customers follow an independent Poisson process of rate φ ij q ij and enter the link queue with a virtual unit, irrespective of whether the customer engages a unit or not in the real system. Thus D is stochastically dominated by D = P oi( i,j φ ij q ij τ ij ). Further, since D is bounded above by m, D is also stochastically dominated by D = min{ D, m}.
Next, from Lemma 21, we know that conditioned on there being M available units in the steadystate system, the distribution of units in node queues is identical to that of an n-node M -unit Gordon-Newell network; moreover, from Lemma 6, we have that for any n-node, m-unit Gordon-
Further, by definition of D we observe that
We can now apply a standard Chernoff bound for the Poisson random variable D (cf. from Lemma 35 in Appendix F), using the assumption that m − 2 m ln(m)
In particular, we may bound 
We can use the above to bound the availability in Inequality (12) as
Simplifying, we obtain the result.
We are now ready to extend our pricing/control policies to the setting with transit delays. In order to do so, we need to first extend the elevated flow relaxation by adding an extra constraint. The main observation is that in an m-unit system with transit delays, there is an additional conservation constraint induced by the fact that the number of units in the link queue can not exceed m. As before, let f m ij (q) = q ij φ ij denote the expected rate of units entering link queue X ij ; then by Little's law (cf. [Kel11] or [Ser99] ), we have that the expected number of units in link queues is given by i,j φ ij q ij τ ij , which, in an m-unit system, must be bounded by m. To incorporate this, we need to add an additional rate-limiting constraint to the elevated flow relaxation wherein we ensure that i,j φ ij q ij τ ij ≤ m. This gives us the Rate-Limited Elevated Flow Relaxation Program in Algorithm 5.
Algorithm 5 The Rate-Limited Elevated Flow Relaxation Program
Require: arrival rates {φ ij }, value distributions F ij (·), reward curves R ij (·), scaling parameter ε m .
Theorem 23. For any objective function Obj m with concave reward curves R ij (·) in the m-unit system, let quantiles q be the output of Algorithm 5 with input ε m := 2 ln m/m, Opt m be the value of the objective function for the optimal state-dependent pricing policy, and m ≥ 100. Then
Proof. The proof follows a similar roadmap as that of Theorem 3. In particular, we argue that 1. the rate-limited elevated flow relaxation provides an upper bound for any state-dependent policy, 2. the rate-limited elevated flow relaxation solution is achieved by a state-independent policy in the infinite-unit system, and 3. the ratio of the performance of any state-independent policy q in the infinite-unit and m-unit system is equal to the maximum availability A m (q).
First, similar to Lemma 4, note that since the realized flows in the m unit system must obey the conservation laws encoded by the rate-limited elevated flow relaxation, hence Opt m is bounded by the solution to the rate-limited elevated flow relaxation (i,j) φ ij R ij (q ij ). Moreover, since per-ride rewards I ij (·) are non-increasing in q, therefore scaling the q ij by (1 − ε m ) results in an elevated objective value that obeys
and moreover, i,j φ ij q ij τ ij ≤ m · (1 − ε m ). Now, using similar arguments as in Lemma 5, we can show that using a state-independent policy q in the infinite-unit limit gives Obj ∞ ( q) = (i,j) φ ij R ij ( q ij ) (note that we use the same q as derived from the m unit rate-limited elevated flow relaxation in the infinite unit limit; in other words, we scale the number of units to infinite, but retain the constraint i,j φ ij τ ij q ij ≤ m for a fixed m). Next, from Lemma 11, we get that Obj m ( q) = A m ( q)Obj ∞ ( q). Finally, using Lemma 22, we get the desired bound
Note that for any fixed n, the theorem shows that the rate-limited elevated flow relaxation policy is asymptotically optimal as m → ∞ for any demand rates and transit delays {φ ij , τ ij }; this recovers and gives a finite-m characterization for the asymptotic results in [BDLY16, OW16] .
Constrained point pricing
In this section, we focus on a special case of the vanilla pricing problem wherein the platform is only allowed to set point prices, i.e. prices based on the origin node, and the value distributions of all customers arriving at a node are identical (i.e. p ij = p i , respectively q ij = q i , and F ij (·) = F i (·) for all i, j). We provide a simple optimal pricing policy for the infinite-unit system, which involves just one eigenvector computation (for throughput/social welfare) or a concave maximization over a single variable (for revenue).
We then consider the additional constraint that prices are only allowed to come from a discrete price set. Using our infinite-to-finite unit reduction, all our results are then translated back to the finite unit setting. We emphasize that in the latter restricted settings, there may not be a feasible solution satisfying demand circulation.
Unrestricted price set: We begin by providing the point pricing equivalent to Algorithm 1 and Theorem 3.
Algorithm 6 The Point Pricing Elevated Flow Relaxation Program
Require: arrival rates {φ ij }, value distributions F i (·), reward curves R ij (·). 1: Find {q i } that solves the following point price relaxation:
Theorem 24. Consider any objective function Obj m for the m-unit system with concave reward curves R ij (·). Let p be the pricing policy returned by Algorithm 6, Opt m be the value of the objective function for the optimal state-dependent point pricing policy in the m-unit system. Then Notice that the optimization problem in Algorithm 6 has the demand circulation property as a constraint; thus, with the resulting pricing policy, the availability is equal at every node (cf. Lemma 9). Recall from Section 2.3 that the availability at each node in the infinite-unit system depends on the traffic intensity at that particular node and the maximum traffic intensity among all nodes. Further, the traffic intensity at each node i depends on (i) the ith coordinate of the eigenvector w of the routing matrix {φ ij (q i )/ k φ ik (q i )} i,j∈[n] 2 , and (ii) the rate of arrivals k φ ik at i. In particular, r i (p) = w i (p)/ j φ ij q ij . In the setting of point prices however, w is unaffected by the prices and r i (q) = r j (q)∀i, j implies that w i k φ jk q j = w j k φ ik q i for all i, j. Substituting in the optimization problem for every j q j = w j k φ ik q i /w i k φ jk , we find that the convex optimization problem can actually be written in just one variable. Further, in the case of social welfare, and revenue, it is always the case that max i q i = 1 for an optimal solution in the infinite-unit system. Hence, in these cases only one eigenvector computation is needed.
Discrete price set: We now show how the pricing policy from Algorithm 6 can be modified when there is a discrete set of available prices for each node. We handle this case with an extra loss in the objective that depends on how well the prices represent each part of the distribution. In particular, we obtain the pricing policy p by solving for the unconstrained case as in Algorithm 6 to obtain prices p and then setting each p i to be the lowest available price greater or equal to p i . We now prove the performance guarantee for p.
Theorem 25. Let p 1 i , . . . , p
be the set of available prices for node i in increasing order,
be the corresponding quantiles (in decreasing order), and p , p be defined as above.
Suppose that for all i there exists an available price p i such that q i ≤ q i , and that there exists α such that for all i and all s, α · q s i ≥ q s+1 i
. Then,
where Opt m is the objective of the optimal state-dependent policy for discrete prices in the m-unit system.
Proof. Since Obj(p ) is an upper bound on the unrestricted point pricing problem (cf. Theorem 24), it is also an upper bound on Opt m . Lemma 5 implies that Obj(p ) = Obj ∞ (p ), since p fulfills the demand circulation property (cf. Algorithm 6). Further, by Lemma 6,
Thus, what remains is to bound Obj ∞ ( p) with respect to Obj ∞ (p ). Since q i ≤ q i for all i and the per-ride rewards I ij (·) are assumed to be non-decreasing in the quantiles, we only need to bound the changes in the availabilities of the infinite-unit system for each i.
Since the w i are constant under point-pricing, the availabilities are only affected by prices in the denominator, where the change is equal to q i /q i . Thus, no traffic intensity changes by more than a factor of α and the result follows.
The assumption that the value distributions at each node are identical may seem too restrictive. Notice though that the same analysis also applies to the following setting: for each i, j there exists a base price d ij (e.g., based on geographic distance). This price is multiplied by the (state-dependent) control p i , which is the same for all j. The behavioral assumption is now that customers react the same way to the control, regardless of their destination.
Conclusions
We have studied pricing and optimization in shared vehicle systems for various objectives. Our work parallels existing work through our use of a closed-queueing network model to capture network externalities. It distinguishes itself, however, through the rigorous guarantees in finite settings and the generality of controls/objectives considered. In that sense, it unifies and extends several results from the literature. In particular, our main technical contribution (the elevated flow relaxation), has the potential to apply to other settings. Given the widespread use of fluid limits in the queuing theory literature, our framework may yield provable guarantees for finite instances in these settings as well.
Further, it would be interesting to study how our framework can be extended to constrained settings beyond multi-objective and discrete prices. For instance, in recent events, Uber was exposed to bad publicity when turning off surge pricing for trips originating at JFK airport. While the details of these events are not mathematical in nature, it demonstrates the significance of studying settings where prices (in some locations) are bounded above. Additionally, our pricing policies do not impose triangle inequality, potentially creating incentives for customers to reach their destination via an extra stop. Addressing such strategic considerations opens up an intriguing avenue for future research.
Finally, although our work suggests that state-independent prices have strong performance, this is under the steady-state assumption with complete knowledge of the system parameters. Relaxing either of these assumptions is a compelling extension of our work.
A Irreducibility of the Priced System
We justify here our assumption from Section 2 that the infinite-unit solutions we obtain induce a connected graph; to do so, we first need to assume that the graph created by edges (i, j) on which φ ij > 0 is strongly connected. We then prove that given any solution to the infinite-unit pricing problem, there exists a solution with arbitrarily close objective that also induces a connected graph. Throughout this section we work with the flow f ij,∞ (p) induced by the demands in the infinite-unit system, but suppress all dependencies on ∞ in the notation. Theorem 26. Let > 0. For any non-decreasing objective and any pricing policy p that induces a supply circulation f ij on k components in the infinite-unit system, there exists a policy p inducing a supply circulation f ij in the infinite-unit system such that the graph with edge-set E = {(i, j) : f ij > 0} is strongly connected and the objective with p is at least (1 − ) times that of p.
Proof. To prove the theorem we repeatedly add flow to edges (i, j) with f ij = 0, but also take flow away from edges (ī,j) with fīj > 0. To ensure that edges of the second kind do not have their flow reduced by too much, we set
Whenever we decrease flow on an edge, this is done by an additive δ amount. Reducing flow at most k times to obtain f ij we guarantee that f ij ≥ (1 − )f ij holds.
As we assume our underlying graph with edge-set {(i, j) : φ ij > 0} to be strongly connected, it must be the case that there exists a minimal sequence of components C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C d = C 1 , d > 2, and nodes u , v ∈ C such that λ u v +1 > 0, but f u v +1 = 0. In particular, it being minimal implies that no component other than the first appears repeatedly.
Since each u , v are in the same strongly connected component of the graph with edge-set E, we know that for each there exists a simple path from u to v with positive flow on it. We change flows as follows: for all pairs (u , v +1 ) we increase flow by δ and for each edge along the path from u to v we decrease flow by δ. At all other edges the flow remains unchanged.
We need to first argue that the new circulation is feasible. Each node along a path within a component has its in-flow and out-flow reduced by δ, whereas at the nodes u i , v i both the sum of in-flows and the sum of out-flows has remained the same. At all other nodes, nothing is altered. Thus, flow conservation continues to hold. By choice of δ none of the edge-capacities are violated. Thus, the resulting flow is a circulation with at most k − 1 distinct components. Applying this procedure k − 1 times, we obtain a single strongly connected component.
Finally, since I ij (·) are nondecreasing with price and decreasing flow is equivalent to increasing prices, the choice of δ guarantees that the objective on paths from u to v has been reduced by at most a factor of (1 − ). Since I ij (·) are non-negative, the additional flow on edges from u to v +1 only increases the total objective. Thus, the pricing policy p that induces the circulation f ij has the desired properties.
B Concave Reward Curves
In this section, we investigate conditions under which throughput, social welfare and revenue satisfy the conditions of theorem 3. In particular, we first show that the respective reward curves R(q) = qI(q) are concave. We then prove that the concave reward curves assumption implies the non-increasing (quantiles) per-ride rewards assumption.
Lemma 27. Revenue (i) satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 3 under regular value distributions, Throughput (ii) and Social Welfare (iii) satisfy the assumptions under any value distribution.
Proof. We drop the subscripts throughout this proof to simplify notation. We begin by considering (i) revenue, for which the result holds due to the fact that the reward curve is concave if and only if the distribution is regular (cf. Proposition 3.10 in [Har14] ). For (ii) throughput, R(q) = q·I(q) = q is a linear function of q for any value distribution and thus concave.
Lastly, for (iii) social welfare, we use the so-called hazard rate h(y) = f (y) 1−F (y) of a distribution F with density f . Given F , denote by p(q) and q(p) a price as a function of its corresponding quantile and vice-versa. Then, by the definition of hazard rate:
Taking logarithms and differentiating, we obtain:
The first derivative
h(y)dy dp(q) dq =
where the first equality comes from Equation (17), the second from (16).
The second derivative is then given by
which concludes the proof of the Lemma.
Lemma 28. If some objective satisfies the concave reward curves assumption, it also satisfies the non-increasing (in quantiles) per-ride rewards assumption.
Proof. Suppose an objective has concave reward curves, but does not have non-increasing (in quantiles) per-ride reards. Then there must exist i, j, q 1 , q 2 with 0 < q 1 < q 2 such that
. Then
where the inequality follows from Jensen's inequality on since the rewards curve qI ij (q) is a concave function. As q 1 > 0, it follows that I ij (q 2 ) ≤ I ij (q 1 ) and we therefore arrive at a contradiction.
C Infinite-unit Limit
In Section 2.1 we briefly introduced the infinite-unit limit of the Gordon-Newell network, i.e., the characterization of the limiting Markov chain wherein we keep all system parameters (φ ij , F ij , etc.) constant, and scale m → ∞. We also mentioned that the primary result we use from this characterization is that the steady-state availability of each node i is given by A i i, ∞(p) = r i (p)/ max j r j (p), and that there exists at least one node i with A i,∞ (p) = 1 (cf. Proposition 2). We now describe this limit in a little more detail. Our presentation follows closely that of [Ser99] , Section 3.7, which we refer the reader to for more details.
Recall first that given p = {p ij }, we can compute quantities w i (p) and r i (p), which are independent of m. We define r max = max i r i (p) and r i (p) = r i (p)/r max . We also define J = {i ∈ [n] | r i (p) = 1} to be the set of bottleneck nodes in the network (note that J has at least one element), and K = [n]\J be the remaining nodes. Then as m → ∞, the stationary distribution of the m-unit system (as specified in Equation (2)) converges to a limiting distribution 13 as m → ∞, with the following properties:
• The bottleneck nodes, i.e., nodes in set J with r i (p) = 1, all have A i (p) = 1.
• The bottleneck nodes feed the non-bottleneck nodes in set K, which together form an open Jackson network, with each node behaving as a stable M/M/1 queue.
• For all i ∈ K, we have
The above description has the following physical interpretation: in the infinite-unit limit, the bottleneck nodes have an infinite queue of units, and hence always have availability 1. Moreover, the rate of units traveling from one of these nodes i to a non-bottleneck node j is exactly φ ij (p). Thus from the perspective of a non-bottleneck node j, it appears as if a steady-stream of units (with total rate < φ j (p)) arrive from (and depart to), an external node; the number of units in node j therefore behaves according to the dynamics of a stable M/M/1 queue. Lemma 29. The objective of the elevated flow relaxation for the policy returned by Algorithm 1 upper bounds the objective of any state-independent policy p in the infinite-unit system.
Proof. This follows if we show that the flows in the infinite-unit limit satisfy supply circulation and demand bounding. The latter is clear from the dynamics of the system (the flow out of a node can not exceed the rate of arriving customers). To see that the former follows from the above listed properties, note that w i (p) is defined to be the leading left eigenvector of {λ ij (p)} i,j , where λ ij (p) = φ ij (p)/φ i (p). From this we get for all i:
Dividing both sides by r max (p) we get that for all nodes i, we have j r j (p)φ ji (p) = k r i (p)φ ik (p). However, as we noted above, A i,∞ (p) = r i (p), and hence f ∞ ij (p) = r i (p)φ ij (p). Thus the f ∞ ij (p) satisfy flow conservation.
Combining with Lemma 5, we get that the elevated flow relaxation solution is tight in the infinite-unit limit. Lemma 30. The objective of the elevated flow relaxation for the policy returned by Algorithm 1 is equal to the objective of the optimal state-independent policy in the infinite-unit system.
D Settings without Prices
In Section 5.1 we discussed how two control levers, redirection of supply and of demand, can be combined with pricing to obtain the same guarantees we obtain for the pure pricing problem. We now show that our technique extends to settings in which only redirection of supply/demand is allowed, but pricing is not. Because demand cannot be modulated in these settings, one may assume that I ij is constant for each i and j, because I ij is not a function of prices. Thus, the elevated objective, defined analogously to Section 3, is always equal to the objective now. Further, the interpretation of our results changes slightly.
Similarly to Algorithm 6, we introduce quantiles q i ; unlike Section 5.4 however, we cannot change prices to modulate demand according to these quantiles. We adopt the same notation as in Section 5.1, with the exception that we do not allow for pricing policies and thus everything is just a function of r. The quantiles q accordingly need to be defined differently -we define q i = A i,m (r) and observe that the resulting flows are within the following polytope (similarly to Sections 5.1 and 5.4):
As in Section 5.1, these constraints stem from demand bounding, supply circulation, and the limitation that only non-empty arriving vehicles may be rebalanced. Optimizing the elevated objective over the polytope given by these constraints is a linear program and yields an upper bound on the objective. Consider the redirection policy r obtained via / from the solution of the linear program (cf. Algorithm 7). In the next Lemma, we bound the infinite unit performance of this policy compared to the value of the linear program.
Algorithm 7 The Elevated Flow Relaxation Program for Redirection without Prices
Require: arrival rates {φ ij }, per-ride rewards I ij , rerouting costs c ij . 1: Find {q i , z ij } that solves the the following relaxation:
Output redirection probabilities r ij = z ij / k φ ki q ki Lemma 31. Denote by q the quantiles solved for in the relaxation of Algorithm 7 and by r the redirection probabilities returned. Then Obj ∞ ( r) ≥ Obj( q, r).
Proof. To prove the Lemma, consider first Obj ∞ ( q, r), the objective obtained when implementing both the redirection policy r and the quantiles q that Algorithm 7 solves for. By the same argument as in Lemma 14, all availabilities are equal to 1 (and all traffic intensities are equal) in this system, and thus its objective matches Obj( q, r). In order for us to compare Obj ∞ ( q, r) with Obj ∞ ( r) we define some i max ∈ arg max j q j . Increasing each quantile by a factor of 1 q imax we obtain quantilesq. Notice that in the system with quantilesq, the traffic intensity at each node is changed by the same factor, so the traffic intensities are still equal and the availability is still 1 at every node. 14 Thus, Obj ∞ (q, r) ≥ Obj( q, r). Thereafter, we change the quantiles, one after the other, at each node j (other than i max ) to 1. Notice that each such change only decreases the traffic intensity at j, so the maximum traffic intensity remains unchanged. The lemma follows because the decrease in the traffic intensity (and thus in the availability) at each node j = i max is exactly accounted for by the increased rate of arrivals at j, i.e. f jk,∞ (q, r) does not change when the jth coordinate of the quantiles is set to 1. Therefore, Obj ∞ ( r) ≥ Obj( q, r). 
E Tightness Of Our Guarantees
In this section, we discuss an example of [WJ14] , that proves that the guarantees we prove for our algorithms are tight. Interestingly, this does not require the distinction between state-dependent and state-independent policies, i.e. the objectives obtained through our algorithms can be as far away from the optimal state-independent policy as from the optimal state-dependent polcy. Proof. Consider a system of n nodes {1, . . . , n} with demand only occurring from nodes i to i + 1 and from node n to node 1. In particular, suppose that for some k that is yet to be set, we have φ 12 = φ 23 = . . . = φ n−1 n = k, and φ n1 = 1. Further, suppose we are maximizing throughput, though the same construction works for revenue and social welfare. The policy returned by Algorithm 1 sets quantiles q 12 = q 23 = . . . = q n−1 n = 1 k and q n1 = 1. Given that the availability of each node is then m m+n−1 (cf. Lemma 6 with all inequalities holding tightly) and that there are n nodes from which a ride can occur (at rate 1), the throughput is nm m+n−1 . On the other hand, for the solution that sets all quantiles to 1, the throughput converges to n as k → ∞. Intuitively, this is because the expected time between an arrival at node n (triggering that unit to move to node 1) and the expected return time of that unit to node n converges to 0. Thus, for each arrival at node n, occurring at rate 1, the system observes m rides. The details of this argument can be found in Proposition 3 of [WJ14] .
F Omitted proofs
Lemma 34 (Lemma 18 restated). For Λ max = 2Φ /(Ψ − c), q(Λ max ) is a feasible solution of the elevated flow relaxation.
Proof. Since all objectives are positive, notice first that any infeasible solution has Lagrangian at most Φ . Exhibiting the existence of a feasible solution with Langrangian objective greater Φ thus suffices. Notice that for Λ = Λ max , the solution q(∞) (that only maximizes Ψ(·)) is such a solution as it gives an objective greater Φ : L(Λ, q(∞)) = Φ( q(∞)) + 2Φ (Ψ − c) ( Ψ( q(∞)) − c) ≥ 2Φ > Φ .
Finally, we present a basic Chernoff tail bound for the Poisson random variable, which we use in Section 5.3
